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Prior to 1994, the Bank of France could be described as the quiet giant of European 
central banking. Most comparative studies of central bank independence rank the pre-
1994 Bank of France as one of the more dependent in its relationship to government. 
While responsible for the range of operations typical of central banks and exerting 
potentially considerable influence on policy making, the Bank was very much in the 
policy making shadow of the Treasury direction of the Ministry of Finance, which held 
ultimate control over most aspects of monetary policy and considerable influence in 
prudential supervision (Goodman 1992; Prate 1987). Establishing its subordinate position 
in republican policy making, the 1936 and 1945 acts that nationalized the Bank placed it 
under the ‘tutelle’ of the Prime Minister’s office. While in a weak position in relation to 
the Treasury, the pre-independence Bank and its Governors firmly asserted the 
importance of defending the value of the national currency during periods of strong 
inflationary pressure and refused to accede to certain demands that touched upon the 
limited range of areas under the Bank’s control according to legislation (see Prate 1987 
for examples). The Treasury had direct say over monetary policy and dominated credit 
provision until the financial market liberalization that took place from 1985 onwards. The 
end of the encadrement du credit system – by which the state directed credit provision – 
and liberalization enhanced the relative power of the Bank by increasing the importance 
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of interest-rate policy, over which the Bank had considerable influence by virtue of its 
unrivalled capacity to monitor French money supply and inflation (Goodman 1992).  
 
Europeanization has had a significant impact on the power of the Bank of France since 
the 1970s. The operation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) and the strong (stable) franc policy of the second half of the 
1980s and the 1990s reinforced the importance of interest-rate policy and currency 
reserve management, also controlled by the Bank, although the need to follow closely 
German monetary policy effectively limited Bank of France (and French government) 
margin of manoeuvre (Howarth 2001). The German insistence on the privileged position 
of the EU central bank governors in the negotiations on EMU also reinforced the position 
of the Bank Governor in relation to the Treasury. Governor Jacques de Larosière, former 
head of the IMF, played a crucial role in the discussions on EMU leading to Maastricht 
both as a credible interlocutor of the Bundesbank and through his efforts to convince 
President Mitterrand and others of the need to accept German demands on independence 
(Howarth 2001). 
 
This chapter will show that Europeanization since 1993—the independence of the Bank 
of France in 1994 and the transfer of monetary policy powers to the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in 1999—had a clear and direct impact on the power and roles of the 
Governor and the members of the Conseil de la Politique Monétaire (MPC), but a less 
obvious impact on the organization and responsibilities of the Bank itself. Independence 
and the 1999 transfer have also had a direct impact upon the Bank’s role in public life. 
 3 
Well over a decade since independence, monetary policy remains more politicized in 
France than in most Eurosystem member states, thus bucking the trend of apoliticisation 
(Marcussen chapter). In terms of the Bank’s core operations, however, political hostility 
has created only marginal difficulties.  
 
The Difficult Move to Independence 
 
The failure to move towards apoliticised monetary policy in France is due to history and 
the politically motivated claim that the monetary policy pursued by the independent Bank 
of France and then ECB has had a negative impact upon the French economy. Following 
the Second World War, opposition to the delegation of policy-making powers to 
autonomous agencies was embedded in a new Republican consensus (Fabre Guillemant 
1998). Briefly, there are four additional sources of French aversion to central bank 
independence: the negative perception of the experience of independence prior to the 
Second World War, when economically powerful private interests were seen as 
dominating monetary policy; the belief that control over economic and monetary policy 
should not be separated; the perception — rooted in the history of French political 
economy — that low inflationary economic policies could be maintained by 
democratically elected officials guided by enlightened bureaucrats and advisers; and 
power considerations within the French administration, notably opposition to 
independence in the Treasury and the elite network of the Financial Inspectorate. 
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On various occasions prior to independence, the Bank Governor asserted to governments 
the importance of price stability and the need to maintain the value of the currency (Koch 
1986; Mamou 1988; Patat and Lutfalla 1986; Prate 1987; Valance 1996) and occasionally 
did so in very stern terms. Yet between 1944 and 1994, they rarely intervened publicly in 
economic and monetary policy and, when they did, could be sorely rebuked and even 
replaced, as in 1974 (Prate 1987: 210-11). The precise nature of government control and 
the legal status of the Bank were not defined in the laws on nationalisation. Assertions of 
autonomy depended upon the personalities involved and the degree to which 
governments diverged from the goal of monetary stability. A January 1973 law clarified 
Bank powers and granted it greater scope to modify its monetary mechanisms. The 1973 
reform set out certain basic principles, allowing the Bank’s General Council free rein in 
their practical application. However, the reform did not eliminate ultimate State control 
over monetary policy. Various requests from the Bank of France to gain greater 
autonomy were opposed by governments and the Treasury (Prate 1987). Pre-1994 
relations with the Treasury and debates on monetary policy have been frequently 
described as difficult, with the Treasury maintaining the final say and considerable 
influence (Koch 1983; Mamou 1988; Prate 1987). 
 
There was strong political opposition to independence right up to the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991.  None of the political parties supported the concept of central 
bank independence (Balleix-Banerjee 1999). Yet, public opinion was generally in favour 
of the EMU project and the transfer of monetary policy to the European level. The 
prioritisation of European objectives resulted in French government support for EMU and 
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tolerance of central bank independence. In the context of global ideological trends in 
favour of independence, EMU created an historic opportunity to overcome strong 
domestic political and institutional resistance. Moreover, the rapid move to independence 
at the start of Stage II of the EMU project (1 January 1994) was justified as building 
confidence in the franc in the context of record levels of speculation, not the desirability 
of independence per se.  
 
The support threshold necessary to pass legislation on independence was raised even 
further because the French Constitutional Council initially blocked legislation in 1993 on 
the basis of a constitutional provision that effectively prevented the delegation of policy-
making powers to an independent body. The support of three-fifths of the members of 
both chambers of parliament was also necessary to modify the constitution to achieve 
independence. Moreover, two core elements of EMU found in the Maastricht Treaty that 
block governments from soliciting the central bank on monetary policy and establish 
price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy were removed from the French 
law on independence.1 They were successfully challenged by parliamentarians in the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that they contradicted the constitutional principle 
that the government defines the policy of the country. Nonetheless, the real effect of 
removing these core elements of the EMU bargain from the French law was negligible 
because they applied by virtue of the provisions found in the Maastricht Treaty. In the 
Monetary and Financial Code, which replaced the 1993 law at the start of 2001, the 
wording of the Statute of the ECB and the ESCB was incorporated and the goal of price 
stability established as primary for the Bank of France. As with the ECB, no requirement 
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of transparency was imposed upon the Bank of France. Article 3 of the 1993 law grants 
the MPC the power to determine the conditions according to which its minutes could be 
made public. The non-renewable, nine-year fixed terms of the six external MPC members 
and the renewable, six-year fixed terms of the Governor and deputy governors (with an 
age limit of 65) provided a much stronger guarantee of personal independence than was 
previously the case – when no guaranteed fixed term was provided.2  
 
Politicised Monetary Policy in the Post-independence Era 
 
Despite the broad support for the EMU project in the French political class and consistent 
public support for EMU, leading French government and opposition politicians have 
refused to desist from politicizing monetary policy. From early 1994, Government 
politicians have repeatedly ‘scapegoated’ the Bank of France and then the ECB for 
French economic difficulties – worsened by high interest rates and then a strong euro. A 
surprising number of both government and opposition politicians have been persistent in 
their challenge to ECB goals and independence, particularly during electoral periods. 
Several recent examples can be provided. As Finance Minister, Sarkozy called for the 
ECB to adopt a Federal Reserve-style target that includes economic growth (Financial 
Times, 11.6.2004), comments that he repeated as presidential candidate3 and then 
President. Proposal 89 of Ségolène Royal’s 2007 Socialist Party presidential electoral 
programme called for the inclusion of an employment creation objective in the ECB’s 
statute.4 In December 2006, when criticising the ECB’s decision to raise its interest rate, 
 7 
Royal insisted that the Bank be ‘submitted to political decisions’ because it is not its job 
‘to order [commander] the future of our economies’.5 
 
Politicised Appointments to the Monetary Policy Council 
The French law on independence provided less protection against overtly political 
appointments than the TEU. Members of the Bank’s MPC did not have to have any 
monetary policy experience – the legal requirement was that proposed candidates have 
experience and recognised competence in monetary, financial and economic spheres. 
This opened the way for highly partisan political appointments, with limited or no 
technical understanding of monetary policy and central banking – unusual in the Euro 
Area – which was the norm from 1993 to the early 2000s. Moreover, the process of 
appointment of the MPC and Monetary Committee members created the possibility of 
strongly divergent perspectives on monetary policy-making and a less orthodox Bank 
leadership than that of the pre-independence Bank of France. Initially (from 1994 to 
2002) there were six ‘external members’ and three ‘internal members’. Every three years 
the President and the prime minister selected two external members from a list of six, 
with two nominees presented by each of the presidents of the National Assembly, the 
Senate and the Economic and Social Council. However, given the reach of the 
President’s and prime minister’s influence it can be assumed that at least some of the 
nominees were pre-approved. On one occasion, the President of the Senate complained 
publicly that his preferred nominee was not appointed. The President alone selects the 
three ‘internal members’:  the Governor and two deputy governors. Table 6.1 
demonstrates that few of the MPC and Monetary Committee members had or have any 
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direct experience of monetary policy making, and few had or have any training in the 
field.  
 
<Insert Table 6.1 here or where appropriate in this section> 
 
In the first MPC selected in 1993, only one deputy governor had worked previously in the 
Bank. Four of the first six external members of the MPC could be labelled 
uncontroversial supporters of the strong franc policy and EMU. However, the two 
members nominated by the Euro-sceptic president of the National Assembly, Phillipe 
Séguin, were known opponents of both the strong franc policy and EMU (see Table 6.1). 
Three of the following four appointees (between 1994 and 1997) held similar opposing 
positions. In 1997, in a very overt demonstration of his dislike for Bank independence 
and the strong franc policy, President Chirac appointed Jean-René Bernard and Pierre 
Guillen to the MPC – both leading conservative opponents of the Maastricht Treaty and 
the EMS with strong links to senior neo-Gaullist (RPR) politicians. Chirac ignored the 
preferences of the centrist and pro-EMU president of the Senate, René Monory, who 
complained to the press. Thus, from 1997 to 2000, five of the six external members, the 
majority of MPC members, had previously been opposed to EMS membership, the strong 
franc policy, central bank independence, EMU and the Maastricht Treaty. All six had 
opposed EMU. Members of this anti-EMS majority called publicly for a rapid drop in 
French interest rates (Le Monde 29.11.96; 21.10.98). In November 1996, two of the 
externally appointed members, Marchelli and Gérard, publicly expressed their 
disapproval of the EMU convergence criteria and argued in favour of an additional 
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criterion emphasizing employment levels (Le Monde 22 and 29.11.96). Given the 
necessity of respecting the French government’s commitments to the inflation and 
interest-rate convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, the members of the MPC were 
unable to modify French policy in any significant way. Moreover, the MPC did not 
modify its monetary policy strategy (established in 1994) of two per cent inflation and 
M3 targeting, which corresponded to Bundesbank practice. Since 1999, the appointments 
to the MPC have been less controversial and more pro-Maastricht. Nonetheless, they 
remain noteworthy for their highly political character.  
 
Political allegiance also likely determined the appointment of both Trichet and Christian 
Noyer as governors (in 1993 and October 2003 respectively). Both had previously served 
in ministerial cabinets in centre-Right governments. Trichet had been the head of 
Minister of Finance Edouard Balladur’s cabinet (1986-88). Balladur was Prime Minister 
at the time of Trichet’s appointment. Noyer was a technical advisor to Balladur as 
Finance Minister and then head of the cabinet of two centrist (UDF) ministers of finance 
in the 1990s, Edmond Alphandéry and Jean Arthuis. There was some speculation in the 
French press (Le Monde 8.10.2003; 23.10.2003) that the two other leading candidates for 
the post of governor in 2003 (Hervé Hannoun, the first deputy governor and the candidate 
publicly endorsed by Trichet as his preferred successor, and Jean-Pierre Jouyet, then 
Treasury director) lost out in large part because of their proximity to the Left.  
 
The two Bank governors of the post-independence era – Trichet and Christian Noyer 
(since 2003) – were former heads of the French Treasury (respectively in 1987-93 and 
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1993-95) with strong links to the Financial Inspectorate – the financial administrative 
elite – although Noyer himself is not a member. The result is the continuation of a long-
standing tradition according to which Bank legitimacy relies upon credible leadership and 
reputation for managerial and policy making competence that can only be secured by a 
high-flying career in the French Ministry of Finance. It is unlikely that this situation will 
change for many years to come. Senior Bank of France officials whose careers have been 
entirely within the Bank lack this legitimacy, the personal contacts of top-level Ministry 
of Finance officials and a public profile. However, the strong career links between the 
governors and the Treasury (Ministry of Finance) should not indicate a lack of 
autonomous judgement. Direct experience in central banking has not been prized as a 
criterion of a strong nominee for governor. Moreover, Noyer’s appointment to the ECB’s 
Executive Board in 1998 was unusual, although acceptable according to the ECB statute 
given his experience in the area of monetary policy. He was the only member of the ECB 
Governing Council (then 18 members) with no prior direct professional or academic 
experience in central banking. 
 
The Bank as the Public Defender of ‘Sound Money’ and Structural Reform 
Prior to independence, Bank of France governors were known for their criticism of 
government policy, especially during the Fourth Republic. However, most refrained from 
commenting publicly on government policy-making. Following independence, the Bank 
had to accommodate itself to a more active and public role in promoting a ‘stability 
culture’ in France which is the one of the clearest expressions of increased bank power 
since 1994. Governor Trichet made several thinly veiled attacks on the economic and 
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monetary policy statements of presidential candidates in 1994 and 1995 and regularly 
critiqued government economic policy decisions which appeared to menace the pursuit of 
‘sound money’ policies, the move to EMU, and respect for the Stability and Growth Pact 
(Aeschimann and Riché 1996; Milesi 1998). Trichet repeatedly criticised the lack of 
sufficient structural reforms in France. He attacked the new Plural Left’s brief freeze on 
deficit cutting (Le Monde 25.6.97), the 35-hour week policy (Le Monde 13.12.97), and in 
1999 its handling of the unexpected budget windfall: ‘How is it possible to have a 
windfall when we have debts’ (cited in Patat 2003: 110, ft. 1, author’s translation). 
Indeed, in his final public letter to President Chirac as Governor, Trichet urged the 
President to push for lower public spending and undertake structural reforms (Financial 
Times, 3.8.03). In June 2004, in response to Sarkozy’s attack on the ECB for targeting a 
very low inflation rate, the Bank of France published a response by Governor Noyer 
defending the policy in several leading newspapers (Le Monde, 13.6.04). Noyer’s 
concern about rising French government deficit and debt were expressed publicly on 
several occasions. Most notably, the Bank joined forces with Insée (the national institute 
for statistics and economic studies) and the national court of auditors (the Cour des 
comptes) to produce a succession of reports in June 2004 to express dismay at the state of 
public finances and to insist on the need for on-going structural reform. The personal 
style of the Governor is likely to be of some significance in determining the public profile 
of the Bank of France. Since his appointment in 2003, Christian Noyer has intervened 
much less in the national debate on government spending and economic policy than his 
predecessor.6 
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The Bank attempted to respond to government attacks on its monetary policy by 
appealing directly to the French public. A 1998 poll by Sofres (27-29 May), undertaken 
on behalf of the Bank of France and published in the Le Monde newspaper, showed that 
58 per cent of French people approved of the strong franc (or stable franc) policy, a result 
that nearly matched the results of a June 1996 poll (56 per cent) which was also published 
with the 1998 results (Le Monde, 2.07.1998). Moreover, four years after independence, 
74 per cent of those polled had a positive impression of the Bank (5 per cent ‘very much’ 
and 69 per cent ‘rather positive’), which is an accomplishment for an institution that was 
rarely in the public eye prior to 1994. The relatively strong economic growth of 1998 no 
doubt helped boost these support figures. Only 15 per cent had a negative opinion (12 
‘rather negative’ and only 3 ‘very negative’) with 11 per cent ‘without opinion’. On the 
strong/stable franc policy, only 15 per cent were opposed the policy and 27 per cent did 
not have any opinion. French public opinion was thus supportive (or at least tolerant) of 
the need to maintain low inflation. Trichet, as Governor and then as ECB president, used 
these polls on several occasions to defend ECB policies within France. The polls also 
suggest that French public opinion has been at odds with the French political class.  
 
Ongoing Debate on the Bank’s Powers 
The Bank of France holds all the responsibilities typical of national central banks in 
addition to several less typical or atypical roles. Since 1999, the Bank ensures the smooth 
operation of the payments system and the security of financial transactions; monitors the 
security of the banking system and the stability of the financial markets; conducts bank 
inspections; runs the committee responsible for granting licenses to new credit 
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institutions and allowing bank mergers; contributes to the drafting of regulations on credit 
institutions; collects and analyses French monetary, financial and economic data, 
including balance of payments data; produces three annual growth and inflation forecasts; 
manages French exchange reserves, including gold; and provides banking services to 
individual clients. Independence and EMU have had only marginal impact on these core 
responsibilities of the Bank. The services of the Bank—notably the Macro-economic 
Studies directorate—provide the Governor with quality expert advice on the state of the 
national and international economy and price developments. Since 1999, they do so to 
enable him to make competent recommendations on Euro Area monetary policy. The 
Bank also has a range of atypical roles, two of which it has developed or been assigned 
since 1999. It provides—uniquely in the Eurosystem—a port of entry to non-EU banks 
that want to set up euro-accounts; and it provides advice on personal debt management. 
 
Prudential Supervision 
The Bank of France has long been the centre of intelligence in the French state on the 
national banking sector and the financial markets. Prior to 1994, the Treasury’s control 
over prudential supervision—via the Banking Commission chaired by the Governor of 
the Bank of France but under the ‘tutelle’ or control of the Treasury—rested on expertise 
within the Bank. The latter provided most of the salaried staff to the Banking 
Commission on temporary secondment (approximately 400 officials at any time) and 
most of the detailed information about the banking sector by carrying out operational 
supervision. In 1994, the autonomy of the Banking Commission from the government 
was established in law, while the Treasury’s influence was retained through a single vote 
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on the Banking Commission’s governing board of seven members (five of which are 
nominated by the Minister of Finance). In terms of the day-to-day operation of banking 
supervision, little changed because of Bank of France independence. However, the 
elimination of the Treasury’s ‘tutelle’ ensured the reinforcement of the Governor’s 
leadership position as Commission president with a deciding vote. 
 
This leadership role has been seen in dealing with major problems in the French banking 
sector, as in the difficulties at Société Général of unprecedented losses caused by a single 
trader. In January 2008, the head of the bank, Daniel Bouton, met with Noyer who, in 
effect, chaired a secret crisis committee that also included the head of the Financial 
Market Authority (Gérard Rameix) to decide how to deal with the massive fraud in the 
bank and when to make the information public. For a period of five days (19-23 January), 
in his capacity as President of the Banking Commission and Governor, Noyer discussed 
the difficulties with Bouton and Rameix without informing the government (let alone 
other members of the Banking Commission). Despite the Bank’s longstanding role in 
prudential supervision, prior to independence the Governor never played such a central 
role in the management of a major banking crisis. 
 
Some (Cour des Comptes 1996) see the continued influence of the Ministry of Finance, 
via the selection of five Banking Commission board members and the voting position of 
the Treasury representative as unacceptable. Other observers would prefer the elimination 
of the Commission altogether and the transfer of prudential supervision (indeed, all 
responsibility for monitoring the financial markets) to the central bank, as in the 
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Netherlands and Belgium. France is one of the few countries in the world with shared 
control over prudential supervision that involves several public bodies, including the 
Ministry of Finance. The French Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes) (1996 and 2005) 
and the National Assembly’s and Senate’s Finance Committees (Auberger 1996) have 
called for the full transfer of prudential supervision to the Bank of France as one possible 
preferred option. 
 
However, transfer to the Bank of France is not the only recommended option.  Both the 
Cour des Comptes (1996) and the National Assembly’s Finance Committee (Auberger 
1996; Le Monde 29.6.96) called for increased autonomy and capacity for the Banking 
Commission: the removal of the Treasury representative; the diversification of the 
recruitment of the Commission’s staff (thus decreasing the reliance on the Bank of 
France); the increased representation in the Commission’s decision making body of 
members with direct experience in the banking or business sectors (since 1993, only two 
of the seven members of the Commission necessarily have expertise in the banking and 
financial sector); the reinforcement of the collegial body in relation to the Commission’s 
Secretariat (dominated by the Bank of France officials) so that the collegial body can gain 
greater direct control over the process of banking supervision; and the assignment of 
legal personality to the Commission so that it can pursue banking supervision cases in the 
courts if necessary.  
 
Thus, the future reform of prudential supervision in France will not necessarily result in a 
reinforced role for the Bank. An option closer to the British and German models of an 
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autonomous agency might be preferred. Nonetheless, the National Assembly’s Finance 
Committee (1996) also accepted the logic of maintaining a strong link between the 
central bank and the Banking Commission: ‘The role of the Bank in adjusting the 
liquidity of the entire banking system imposes on the Bank a surveillance role of the 
liquidity of financial institutions. There is thus a certain logic in assigning Bank of France 
officials the job of prudential control of banks’ (Auberger 1996, author’s translation). 
Banking supervision officials within the Bank (interviews 28 January 2008) insist that the 
present organisation of supervision works well and that full transfer to the Bank is 
necessary.  Rather, a clarification of certain rules of intervention (as with the difficulties 
in the Société Générale) would be helpful. Another option is the transfer of prudential 
supervision to the ECB or, at least the transfer of supervision over financial institutions 
with a strong presence in other EU member state markets. Senior officials in the Bank of 
France were opposed to this transfer as unnecessary. However, the unofficial position in 
the bank has shifted and there is growing support for the transfer of some responsibility 
for prudential supervision to the ECB (interviews 28 January 2008).  
 
Other Roles 
Since 1984, the Bank of France Governor has held the presidency of the CECEI (Comité 
des établissements de crédit et des entreprises d'investissement), the body in charge of 
granting individual licenses and authorizations to credit institutions and investment firms 
and responsible for approving banking mergers, and one of twelve votes on the 
Committee (another is held by the Treasury Director). Since the CECEI’s creation in 
1984, the Bank has been one of its principal sources of information and advice, in 
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addition to the Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers), the 
French stock market regulator. Moreover, since 1984 the Bank has been in charge of the 
CECEI’s Secretariat. As such it prepares the examination of applications submitted to the 
Committee. Independence has not had any significant impact on the role of the Bank in 
this body.  
 
Since 1994, the Bank has also had full responsibility over surveillance of the security of 
the payment systems, a responsibility possessed prior to 1994 under the ‘tutelle’ of the 
Minister of Finance. From 2001, the Governor gained control over the presidency of the 
newly established Observatoire des cartes de paiement.  
 
The Bank’s legitimacy in these areas—banking supervision, financial sector supervision, 
payments systems and credit cards—rests upon its unrivalled monetary, financial and 
economic data and well-established capacity for analysis. It also exercises a range of 
functions that in other EU member states are either conducted by the state or left to the 
private sector. The Bank manages the circulation of fiduciary money, provides a service 
to analyse local economic development, and is engaged in personal debt management for 
individuals faced with excessive debt. This unwanted responsibility for personal debt 
management – ‘surendettement’ – was imposed on the Bank in 2006 by the government, 
which pays the bank for the service. Personal debt management became the central role 
of 1300 bank staff members – approximately 10 per cent of the total – and several of the 
regional branches that were not closed in the ‘down-sizing’ from 2003-06, which also 
explains why staff and branch cuts during this period were not as large as initially 
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intended. This new social role consists of helping those who are refused bank accounts / 
credit to sort out their financial affairs. The relatively large number of responsibilities 
assigned to the Bank of France—and ‘surendettement’ in particular—has attracted 
criticism from the Cour des Comptes (2005) which has called for the Bank to be allowed 
to concentrate on its core tasks. 
 
 
Down-Sizing at the Bank of France 
 
Prior to 2004, the Bank was not a model of cost-effective public-sector management, 
which weakened the strength of its calls for structural reform and public sector staff cuts. 
The Bank has long suffered from a problem of over-employment and very generous 
social provisions for its staff including a special pension regime. Prior to independence, 
the Bank engaged in hesitant cuts, watered down in the face of determined union action 
and the opposition of local politicians, who baulked at staff cuts in regional branches or 
their closure. Bitter and lengthy strikes were sparked by reform attempts in 1974 and 
again in 1987, which led to the resignation of one of the deputy governors. The weakness 
of New Public Management ideas in the French administration also helps to explain the 
failure to adopt efficiency enhancing reforms—such as the outsourcing of certain 
technical functions as in Sweden—which could have also achieved staff cuts. In 2003, 
the total staff (included seconded staff) reached 15,755. Independence and the transfer of 
monetary policy in 1999 exposed Bank inefficiency to greater public and government 
criticism. This criticism intensified when, in 2002 and 2003, the Bank ran deficits. In 
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February 2003, a Bank of France report called for the closure of three-quarters of its 
regional branches (166 out of 211), over a period of three years, with 3,200 job cuts (out 
of 9000 in the branches), amounting to nearly one-third of the Bank’s annual budget. A 
second report called for the elimination of services for individual clients.  
 
Cuts have been significant but were less ambitious than those initially called for by the 
Bank’s own management and other government sources:  from 2003 to end-2006, 2,200 
jobs were cut leaving 13,500 staff and 120 branches were closed (less than the three-
quarters called for) leaving 91 branches. The dilution of cuts allowed the Bank to avert 
major strikes. Firings were avoided with early retirement packages, which transferred 
costs onto pension provision. However, the Bank achieved an operational profit in 2006 
for the first time in many years. Sixteen of the remaining 91 branches were transformed 
into ‘local economic observatories’, debt management centres or money sorting centres. 
In December 2005, after eighteen months of difficult negotiations, the Bank achieved a 
major reform to its special pension plan. Further cuts are likely. In its 2005 report, the 
Cour des Comptes recommends the closure of additional branches and insists that the 
Bank remains over-staffed and suffers from a particularly high unit labour cost in relation 
to other comparable administrations and from excessively generous social policies. While 
it is difficult to present the Bank of France as a model of public sector reform, some 
observers, notably trade-union officials representing Bank staff, have pointed to the 
Bank’s strong financial position since 2005—due to cuts, the strength of its investments 
and the sale of gold—to argue that the internal reform was excessively brutal, stretching 
 20 
the staff available for some Bank services—notably debt management (Le Monde, 
19.01.2006).  
 
The Cour des comptes (2005) and the Finance Committee of the National Assembly also 
criticised the continued existence of the Monetary Policy Committee, a body without an 
obvious role following the transfer of monetary policy to the ECB at the start of 1999 and 
the independence of the Bank Governor in determining his stance on ECB monetary 
policy. Responding to these criticisms, in 2002 the government reduced the number of 
external members to four and then, in 2005, to two. In 2006, the de Villepin Government 
adopted a law transforming the MPC into the Monetary Committee consisting of seven 
members (Governor, 2 deputies and four independent ‘experts’, nominated by the 
presidents of the National Assembly and Senate). The independent ‘experts’ are paid only 
expenses, and their advisory role is emphasised. The ‘experts’ can also hold other posts 
(although not in parliament and government), whereas the external members of the MPC 
could not. 
 
 
The failure to develop the Bank’s research capacity 
 
The Bank of France has long possessed a strong capacity for data collection and analysis, 
which Bank officials argue is unrivalled by other Eurosystem central banks. Through its 
regional offices, the Bank collects detailed monetary, financial and economic data and 
information on French companies that is unavailable to other French and international 
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institutions, and thus has an unrivalled understanding of price developments in France. 
This data is analysed within the well-staffed and resourced Macroeconomic Studies 
Directorate of the Bank to produce a detailed monthly update on the state of the French 
economy. The Bank’s capacity to produce growth and inflation forecasts distinguished it 
from many of its peers, which as in Italy and the UK, rely on Ministry of Finance 
forecasts. The Macroeconomic Studies Directorate also includes staff who analyse 
international economic trends. Interlocutors at the Bank claim that the credibility of their 
Governor’s discourse in ECB Governing Council meetings on the impact of international 
economic developments and the development of prices depends on this analytical 
capacity and gives the Governor more influence in relation to his peers. There are, 
however, obvious chinks in the mail of the Bank’s analytical armour, as demonstrated by 
the lead role assumed by the Bundesbank and Banca d'Italia in developing and managing 
the shared computer platform for TARGET 2—which suggests their superior expertise. 
 
In November 2007, for the first time, the Bank published its own updated growth forecast 
for the year (2007), which in effect updated and corrected the government’s own forecast. 
Bank staff see this development as a small but significant assertion of the Bank’s 
independence (interviews 28.01.08; 30.01.08). In early 2008, the Bank published for the 
first time its own growth forecast for the year ahead (the Bundesbank began the same 
practice for Germany in late 2007). Bank of France staff argue that different analyses by 
the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of France, based on their individual models, result 
in different forecasts and mutual and productive criticism. The publication of Bank of 
France figures also serves as a useful counterpoint to politically manipulated government 
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figures. The government, relying on Ministry of Finance analysis of data collected by the 
national statistical agency, INSEE, publishes the more optimistic upper range economic 
growth figures, whereas the Bank of France publishes a ‘forchette’ of upper and lower 
forecasted rates.  Given the Bank’s monthly economic studies, it is also in a better 
position to provide accurate forecast updates than the government. 
 
In juxtaposition to its capacity to conduct statistical and macroeconomic analysis, the 
Bank is very weak in academic research output, which in turn weakens the intellectual 
power of the Bank in the ‘competition of ideas’ in the Eurosystem and its weight in 
discussions on growth and inflation forecast models. Although a research division was 
first created in the bank in 1909, there is little tradition of academically-oriented research 
at the Bank. According to one leading historian of the Bank (Olivier Frietag, interview 
28.01.2008), the Bank’s hierarchy has had little respect for academically-oriented 
research. No top officials in the Bank have a background in advanced economic research. 
Many are graduates of the elite Ecole Polytechnique: they possess a strong analytical 
capacity that is not, however, academically and theoretically oriented. Bank careers are 
developed through practical training in a diverse range of the Bank’s activities. With 
more open recruitment and career progression procedures in place, this situation may 
change with time. There have been no powerful directors of research, who might have 
been able to attract increased resources. Moreover, the governors, drawn from the 
Ministry of Finance, possess little academic training and thus limited appreciation of the 
importance of academic economic research. Governor Noyer, with his experience of top-
quality research at the ECB, might be different in this regard, but his appointment did not 
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result in any significant increase in research capacity at the Bank. The small number of 
Bank staff members with PhDs is in marked contrast to the central banks in many other 
countries. Several Bank officials also commented on the historic weakness of economic 
research in France – and notably the weakness of market-oriented research – and the 
tendency for some of the country’s best academic economists to seek training and 
employment in the United States.  
 
Those working in the Research Directorate of the Bank claim (interviews 28, 30, 
31.01.2008) that, following independence, the Bank directors recognised that the lack of 
research output damaged the credibility of the Bank as an independent policy making 
authority and its influence within the Eurosystem. They deliberately set about to increase 
the output of research publications that could be accessed outside the Bank. However, the 
officials interviewed also note that the desire to gain a reputation for the production of 
academically excellent research has not been supported by a willingness to provide 
increased financial resources. The financial difficulties of the early 2000s and the power 
of trade unions that have made the reallocation of resources from the branches to the 
centre difficult provide additional explanations for this failure. The more academically-
oriented output of the Bank is limited; the number of peer-reviewed academic journal 
articles published by Bank staff remains very low in comparison to central banks in the 
other large EU member states. The reputation of the Bank’s research in international 
banking and academic circles is very weak. It has few research staff: in 2008 only 
approximately 17 full-time researchers work in the Bank’s Research Directorate and 
publish work in academic journals. The Bank organizes relatively few seminars, although 
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the number has increased since 2000 and four were held in 2007. It is not seen as an 
important centre of debate, discussion on macro-economics and monetary economics. 
There is some concern for this weakness in French political circles. A French Senate 
report (May 2001) criticised the contribution of the Bank to economic research.  
 
The Bank has undertaken a partial response with a small increase in the number of 
research staff, although repeated requests from the head of the Research Directorate for 
more researchers have been rebuffed. The Research Directorate has attempted to make 
the most of the limited resources at its disposal: a visiting academic programme has been 
created, a seminar was organised in cooperation with academics at the Chicago-based 
Northwestern University, and in early 2008 the Bank was in the process of finalising a 
link with an internationally renowned research centre on companies at the University of 
Toulouse, through which the Bank will finance and be associated with top-level academic 
research—albeit research that is not connected to monetary policy. 
 
All the interlocutors at the Bank accepted that their employer suffers from a weak 
presence in both national and international discussions and debates on economic 
developments, despite the occasional interventions of the Governor. Since 1994, the Bank 
has made some efforts to improve its public profile with new publications, targeted 
principally at financial journalists and economists working in central banks and the 
financial sector. The Bank began a working paper series in 1994 (Notes d' Étude et de 
Recherche, NER) published in French and English, with Bank staff writing in a personal 
capacity but subject to quality validation by other qualified Bank staff. Only one paper 
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was published in 1994 and none in 1995, but the number has increased considerably since 
then, with 23 published in 2006 and 30 in 2007. By April 2008, 203 working papers had 
been published. The working papers are written by the full-time researchers but, more 
often, by officials who engage in applied research for the Bank (forecasting, 
macroeconomic, balance of payments and statistical analysis) in the Macroeconomic 
Studies Directorate. From 2002, annually or biannually, the Bank publishes a Revue de la 
Stabilité Financière, with papers by Bank staff, other French and foreign public and 
private-sector officials and leading academic economists, writing on major financial and 
monetary issues for a non-academic audience, principally finance sector professionals. 
For example, the April 2007 issue focused on the impact of hedge funds on financial 
stability and included articles by top central bank officials (from the Federal Reserve 
Board, ECB Executive Board and national central banks), leading economists from the 
London School of Economics and University of Chicago, and major private-sector 
financial companies.  
 
The present first deputy governor, Jean-Pierre Landau, with experience in the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and inspired by Bank of England 
practice, has been a key advocate of improving the communication strategy of the Bank. 
In 2006, he launched what the Bank labeled its ‘publicly-oriented’ economic debate 
series: ‘Debats Economiques’ Occasional Papers series (five to date). In 2007, the Bank 
also launched ‘Documents et débats’ (only one to date on whether the euro was 
inflationist) to address major economic issues in a ‘simple but serious manner’ but also 
ensure accessibility to a wider audience (interview 28.01.08). No other editions are in the 
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pipeline, however, because of Bank sensitivities about covering controversial topics 
(interviews 30, 31.01.08). The head of publications at the Bank (interview 30.01.08) 
believes that not enough is done to disseminate the impressive data that it collects. 
Though few central banks collect the kind of detailed data on national companies, this 
information is not disseminated to a wider public. Other efforts have been made to 
increase the public presence of bank officials in national economic debates. Deputy 
Governor Landau served on the Attali Commission, examining reforms to stimulate 
French economic growth. The head of the Macroeconomic Studies Directorate, Gilbert 
Sette, is a serving member of the Prime Minister’s Council for Economic Analysis. 
 
 
Conclusions: Europeanization, Power and Convergence 
The operations of the Bank of France have been shaped by Europeanization since the 
1970s. The strong franc policy of the 1980s and 90s, the increased importance of interest 
rate policy and currency management, owed a great deal to the influence of the German 
preference for ‘sound money’ and the low inflation bias of the EMS and the EMU 
project. Intensified international financial pressures through increased capital flows and 
the rising exposure of the French economy to non-EU investment further increased the 
importance of interest rate and currency management. Thus, both Europeanization and 
international pressures encouraged convergence to the German standard and increased the 
power of Bank of France in relation to the Treasury prior to independence. The EMU 
project was the catalyst for independence which in turn enhanced the role and power of 
the Bank of France governor in a range of bank activities—notably in his chairmanship 
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and voting role on banking supervision and financial sector accreditation and 
competition—and in national and EU-wide public debate on economic policy and 
structural reform. Europeanization brought about convergence in the monetary policy 
strategy of the Bank of France, which—emulating the Bundesbank—in 1994 adopted a 
two pillar monetary policy targeting inflation and M3 (rather than the M2 targeted 
previously). EMU has allowed the Bank to engage in some specialised operations. 
Notably, it provides, uniquely in the Eurosystem, a port of entry to non-EU banks that 
want to set up euro-accounts. However, apart from the obvious transfer of monetary 
policy to the ECB, Europeanization since 1993 has had only limited impact on the core 
operations of the bank.  
 
As the pre-EMU Bank of France lacked the policy making, research and public role 
possessed by the Bundesbank and the Banca d’Italia, EMU did not result in the 
diminished power and status that the German and Italian central banks have suffered in 
the domestic context because of the transfer of monetary power and research capacity to 
the ECB. Prior to 1994, the Bank of France sought to influence monetary policy decisions 
decided upon by the Treasury. However, the power of both French institutions were 
constrained by the need to follow monetary policy set by the Bundesbank. Attempts by 
the French government in 1993 to challenge the anchor role of the Deutschmark in the 
ERM failed (Howarth 2001). Since 1999, the Bank of France Governor is free of both 
Treasury control and Bundesbank diktat. France has lost monetary autonomy but the 
Bank of France has gained an important autonomous voice in setting Eurosystem 
monetary policy.  
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Independence transformed the Bank of France into an autonomous public actor able to 
express views on—and often indirect criticism of—government policy. The Bank has 
made some—albeit limited—effort to increase its publication output. The Bank’s 
publication of its own growth forecasts—undertaken by few EU NCBs—can be seen an 
expression of its independence. Yet the Bank’s public role has been limited since 1999, 
which is surprising given its independence, the diversity of its roles and its relative size—
it employs more people than any other EU NCB. All officials interviewed at the Bank 
agree that the independent Bank of France, as a non-majoritarian institution, should be 
cautious in its public role and in its dealings with government and, whilst recommending 
reform, should refrain from direct criticism of government policy. Since 1999, 
Europeanization has allowed the Bank to side-step much of the persistent politicisation of 
monetary policy and central banking in French politics:  French politicians direct most of 
their antagonism at the ECB. However, French governments have continued to express 
frustration with activities of the Bank of France when they contradict government 
preferences—as with the handling of the difficulties at the Société Générale. Based on its 
1996 and 1998 opinion polls, the Bank appears to have achieved a measure of public 
support for its operations, at least in monetary policy. However, these polls are now 
dated, and the Bank has not revealed if it has undertaken more recent soundings of public 
opinion on its operations since the transfer of monetary policy in 1999. 
 
There has been a limited degree of convergence with the operations found in other 
Eurosystem central banks. With independence and the loss of monetary policy making 
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powers, the Bank of France has faced intensified pressure to downsize and staff cuts have 
been significant. However, typical of French public administration, the Bank of France 
has long suffered from overstaffing, inefficiencies and failed reform efforts due to a 
strong trade union presence. When staff cuts came they were diluted and far less severe 
than those faced by the Bundesbank. The Bank maintains the largest staff of the EU 
central banks and the greatest diversity of roles. The Bank’s currently stable financial 
situation enables it to resist pressure from the government and the Cour des Comptes to 
downsize further in the near future, unless the Bank manages to shed unwanted tasks, 
notably ‘surendettement’. On the core operations of the Bank, Europeanization has had a 
limited effect of convergence. Unlike the Banca d’Italia which has shed its atypical roles, 
the Bank of France continues to perform a range of functions not held by most other EU 
central banks and has gained some responsibilities since 1994—for example on 
‘surendettement’. There is some pressure from elements within the French administration 
to reform banking supervision to move to either an autonomous regulatory body as in the 
UK and more recently Germany or the full transfer of supervisory powers to the central 
bank as in Dutch/Belgian model. However, the sui generis French system of banking 
supervision is likely to persist for some time given that it has already survived over a 
decade and a half of high profile bank failures and the Treasury is reluctant to surrender 
its role. The failure of the Bank of France to reinforce its research capacity is particularly 
surprising given the relevance of research to national central bank influence in the 
Eurosystem. Some Bank of France officials suggest that the impressive data collection 
and analysis and the relative importance of the French economy in the Euro Area ensures 
the Bank sufficient influence (interviews 28.01.08; 30.01.08). 
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1 Law no. 93-980, 4 August 1993. LOI no 93-980 du 4 août 1993 relative au statut de la 
Banque de France et à l'activité et au contrôle des établissements de crédit 
2 Prior to independence, Governors had no guarantee of longevity and no fixed mandate 
of sufficient length to protect their independence. Nonetheless, Bank Governors generally 
occupied their post for long periods:  seven years for Jacques de Larosiere (1987-93) and 
six years for Renaud de la Geniere (1978-84). Even so, politics intervened regularly.  The 
Socialists removed De la Geniere, and Olivier Wormser had only a short mandate. 
3 ‘Sarkozy wants “protective EU” to offset globalisation’, Euroactiv.com, Friday 
23.2.2007, updated Wednesday 28.2.2007, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/elections/sarkozy-wants-protective-eu-offset-
globalisation/article-161948, accessed on 10 March 2007. 
4 The Socialist candidate appears not to have noticed that the ECB already has this as a 
secondary goal. 
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5 The precise wording that the Socialist 2007 presidential candidate used was ‘soumise à 
des décisions politiques’ (Le Monde, 22.12.2006). 
6 Bank officials interviewed and journalists have put this down to Noyer’s personality, 
described as lacking the charisma of Trichet, timid, secretive and averse to risk (Le 
Monde 23.10.2003). Difficult internal reform at the Bank – of which Noyer had to take 
charge immediately following his appointment – might have encouraged him to engage in 
a less public role. Indeed, Trichet, as ECB president, has been more actively engaged in 
French public debate, appearing several times on high-profile French television and radio 
talk shows to deflect blame for French economic difficulties from the ECB’s monetary 
policies and the strong euro and to call for further domestic structural reform.  
